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Nuclear vs. Coal in Bulgaria 
 
Abstract 
 
In early 2005 the government of Bulgaria commissioned the construction of a new nuclear power 
plant (NPP) near the town of Belene on the Danube border with Romania. The € 4 billion project 
will be executed by a consortium appointed in October 2006 by the National Electric Company 
led by the Russian Atomstroyexport. The work will be overseen by the architect-engineer of the 
plant, the American company WorleyParsons. The endeavor received a “green light” in 
December 2006 when the Nuclear Regulatory Agency of Bulgaria approved the Belene site for 
the construction of a new nuclear power plant. 
 
The need for a new electricity-producing facility in Bulgaria after the shutdown of Units 1-4 of 
Kozloduy is clear. It is not clear, however, what dictated the choice of nuclear technology. Why 
didn’t Bulgaria decide to build another coal-fired plant, since it has always been the case that coal 
plants provide the largest percentage of total electricity production in the country? Was the 
decision based upon the economic advantage of nuclear versus other technologies, in particular 
coal? To address these questions, I will perform a comparative analysis between the Belene NPP 
and a plausible alternative such as a coal-fired Thermal Electric Power Plant (TEPP). The basis 
of the analysis is comparing the marginal cost (MC) of both generating technologies. The lower 
MC technology is deemed economically superior. I identify the input price (PI) of both the 
nuclear plant and the coal plant with their respective levelized discounted cost of electricity 
(LDCE), which I develop based on a literature review. I estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with multiplicative energy terms. The estimated output elasticity of nuclear and coal is 
their respective marginal product (MP). Combining information on the relative PI and MP of both 
technologies I gauge the relative magnitude of their MC.  
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I. Introduction: 
 
The transition from communism and a planned economy to democracy and a market 
economy which took place at the end of 1989 in Bulgaria has not been easy on its citizens. There 
has been much political instability in the decades of this process: it was not until Kostov’s 
government of 1997 that a cabinet lasted its full mandate. The tottering executive power was 
unable to restrain the organized crime which grew out of proportion in that early period. The 
situation for the average citizen was much aggravated by the accompanying economic crisis. In 
January 1997, inflation was allowed to spiral out of control, leading to several months of 
hyperinflation finally subdued with the involvement of the International Monetary Fund which 
established a currency board in June 1997.  
Throughout this tumultuous period there were a few industries which in the public eye 
were pillars of what little economic muscle Bulgaria had to exhibit. One of these was, and still is, 
the power industry. In the heart of it lay the six-unit Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). 
Producing little less than half the total electricity of the country, Kozloduy was clearly an integral 
asset in the Bulgarian energy portfolio. The facility has had an even greater value as a symbol of 
Bulgaria’s technologic prowess.    
The latter explains in large part the social unrest that met the European Union’s (EU) 
demand that Bulgaria shut down Units 1-4 of Kozloduy prematurely. The EU’s rationale for this 
demand was that those older units of the NPP were not up to international safety standards. There 
is mixed evidence whether there might have been room for improvement in that respect for Units 
1 and 2. However, there is conclusive evidence to the contrary for Units 3 and 4: after thoroughly 
examining these reactors on site in Kozloduy for two weeks, 18 inspectors of the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators concluded “the units met all necessary international standards 
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for safe operation” (WNA1 2007). Yet the EU’s demand was not something the government 
could dismiss since accession to the EU has been the number one national priority of Bulgaria 
since the beginning of the changes in 1989. The four reactors were shut down prior to January 1, 
2007, when Bulgaria became a full member of the EU. The decommissioning of Units 1-4 of 
Kozloduy was a blow on the Bulgarian power sector. Although it posed no threat to the stability 
of the country’s own electricity balance, it cut severely into its exporting capabilities upon which 
much of the entire South-Eastern Europe region depended to various degrees.  
To regain its competitive edge in the regional power market, Bulgaria began making plans 
to build a second nuclear facility: the Belene NPP, some 50 miles East of Kozloduy, also on the 
Danube river. The site and project of Belene were not new. It was something started under 
communist rule in 1987 but terminated in 1991 due to lack of funds. By the end of the 1990s 
Bulgaria’s attractiveness to foreign investors had much improved. In 2003 the Bulgarian Energy 
Ministry was approached by five reactor vendors interested in the completion of the Belene 
project (WNA 2007). Encouraged by these offers, in early 2005 the Bulgarian government 
commissioned the construction of the Belene NPP. In October 2006, after an official bidding 
process, a consortium led by the Russian Atomstroyexport (ASE) was chosen over a Skoda-led 
conglomeration, to execute the € 4 billion project. The work will be overseen by the architect-
engineer of the plant, the American company WorleyParsons. The endeavor received a “green 
light” in December 2006 when the Nuclear Regulatory Agency of Bulgaria approved the Belene 
site for the construction of a new NPP (WNA 2007).  
Bulgaria’s decision to build a new nuclear facility seems to be part of a global nuclear 
revival. The September 8th, 2007 issue of The Economist magazine devotes two articles to the 
                                                 
1 WNA stands for World Nuclear Association. 
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international nuclear awakening and another one in The Economist Technology Quarterly from 
the same date.  
The use of nuclear energy for power generation was undertaken after President 
Eisenhower’s speech in front of the UN General Assembly in which he called for the application 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 1954 Lewis Strauss declared in front of the Atomic 
Energy Commission of the United States that one day electricity generated by nuclear power 
would be “too cheap to meter” (as quoted in “Nuclear Dawn”, The Economist Technology 
Quarterly, September 8, 2007). This statement succinctly expresses the optimism many shared 
about this new source of energy. From the onset, nuclear power generation’s comparative 
advantage has been its low operating costs, relative to fossil-fuel power generation. This is in 
large part due to the high energy-density of uranium, the fuel for the fission process that is the 
heart of a NPP. Many nuclear facilities were built in America, Russia and Europe throughout the 
1960s, and 1970s. Currently, there are 439 reactors operating around the world, producing 15% 
of its electricity (“Nuclear dawn”, The Economist Technology Quarterly, September 8, 2007).  
The euphoria ended abruptly, however. With the rise of environmental awareness in the 
1970s, the public became fearful of an eventual meltdown and its consequences. Added to that 
was the growing concern over radioactive waste disposal2. Social concern translated into a more 
convoluted regulatory process. This added to the huge capital investments necessary to build a 
NPP, which have always been the main disadvantage nuclear has had over coal, gas or oil. In the 
US, high interest rates and the leveling of electricity demand exacerbated the problem of 
justifying the huge construction costs of nuclear facilities. In 1979 the first major accident in the 
industry occurred at the Three Mile Island NPP near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. A combination of 
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that to date no country has a permanent repository for the toxic waste to which nuclear fuel is 
turned after about 3 years in the reactor. 
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equipment malfunction and operator error led to the partial meltdown of the reactor core. The 
situation was contained and there were no people harmed and no significant leakage of radiation. 
A true catastrophe took place in April 1986 at the Chernobyl NPP in Ukraine. A series of 
operator failures and design flaws caused the discharge of a huge amount of power in the reactor 
core of Unit 4, leading to an explosion which released large amounts of radioactive material into 
the atmosphere. Thirty emergency workers met their death immediately after the incident. Most 
of Europe was contaminated by the fallout for many years to come. The UN estimates about 
4,000 casualties resulted from the Chernobyl meltdown (“Nuclear power’s new age”, The 
Economist, September 8, 2007). These two accidents were all that was needed to finally seal the 
fate of the nuclear industry for more than two decades: from “too cheap to meter”, it became “too 
expensive to matter” (“Atomic renaissance”, The Economist, September 8, 2007).        
By the end of this year the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission expects to receive 12 full 
applications for the construction of new NPPs. These will be the first full applications in America 
for thirty years (“Atomic renaissance”, The Economist, September 8, 2007). Meanwhile, Finland 
is building the first European NPP in 15 years. In all, there are 31 reactors underway around the 
globe (“Nuclear dawn”, The Economist Technology Quarterly, September 8, 2007). India and 
China are looking at expanding significantly their existing nuclear programs. Vietnam and 
Turkey are looking at starting their own. Clearly, nuclear power’s position has changed.  
There is a substantial change in the technology. Existing reactors are now on-line 90% of 
the time versus 50% in the 1970s (“Nuclear power’s new age”, The Economist, September 8, 
2007). New reactors can burn uranium at a higher efficiency than older ones, making the 
marginal cost of operation even smaller, as well as decreasing the amount of waste generated. 
New reactors are being designed which can use some of the highly active material in the waste 
from conventional reactors as fuel, thereby minimizing the amount of toxic waste even further. 
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Vendors predict smaller construction periods due to learning-by-doing from old plants. New 
designs include “passive safety” systems in which no human intervention is necessary to 
shutdown the reactor and prevent a meltdown in the event of a runaway chain reaction.  
There is some anecdotal evidence the public’s outlook on nuclear is already changing. In 
Britain 30% of the population is against nuclear power, versus 60% three years ago. Similarly 
50% of Americans versus 41% in 2001 favor the expansion of nuclear power (“Nuclear power’s 
new age”, The Economist, September 8, 2007). An improved social attitude is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for streamlining of the regulatory process. This in turn means lower 
construction costs. Overall, improving the technology has translated into improving the 
economics of nuclear power.  
More importantly, there are external benefits associated with nuclear power generation 
which have been amplified by current events. The recent hikes in the price of oil and gas improve 
nuclear’s position relative to these energy sources. The world’s fossil fuel supply is quickly 
shrinking and is in the hands of hostile or shaky governments. In contrast, uranium is thought to 
be relatively abundant and there are large deposits of it in friendly places such as Canada and 
Australia. In this way, nuclear power is able to uniquely address the issue of energy security in 
Western countries. Concern over climate change has put a premium on low greenhouse emission 
technologies. Like wind and solar power, nuclear does not generate any such emissions. Unlike 
wind and solar, nuclear power generation is consistently stable and offers the ability to produce 
large amounts of base-load electricity. NPPs are thus the only viable alternative to fossil-fuel 
generation as global demand for electricity doubles in the next few decades.      
The need for a new electricity-producing facility in Bulgaria after the shutdown of Units 
1-4 of Kozloduy is clear. It is not clear, however, what dictated the choice of nuclear technology. 
Why didn’t Bulgaria decide to build another coal-fired plant, since it has always been the case 
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that coal plants provide the largest percentage of total electricity production in the country? That 
question has never been disputed widely in the Bulgarian media, the reason being the Belene 
project was met with an overall positive attitude from the public which saw it as a way of 
recovering whatever pride in its eyes the country lost by conceding to EU demands of shutting 
down Kozloduy. Was the choice of technology that is to replace Kozloduy dictated by an 
irrational desire to get back at the EU, or was it instead a rational decision based upon the 
economic advantage of nuclear versus other technologies, in particular coal?  
The basis of the analysis is comparing the marginal cost (MC) of both generating 
technologies. Microeconomic theory tells us that the MC of an input (usually labor or capital; in 
this case power-generating technology) is equal to the ratio of that input’s price (PI) to its 
marginal product (MP): 
                                                                  
MP
PMC I=                                                                    (1) 
I identify PI of both the nuclear plant and the coal plant with their respective levelized discounted 
cost of electricity (LDCE), which I develop based on a literature review. I estimate a Cobb-
Douglas production function augmented with multiplicative energy terms. The estimated output 
elasticity of nuclear and coal is their respective MP. Combining information on the relative PI and 
MP of both technologies I gauge the relative magnitude of their MC. The preferred option is, of 
course, the one with the lower MC.  
Although this paper does not aim at making any recommendations, its conclusions will be 
useful in determining whether the optimal mix in Bulgaria’s energy portfolio consists of more or 
less nuclear-generated power. This has obvious policy implications in terms of incentives or 
disincentives for investment in nuclear power generation. The present study adds to the literature 
quantifying the new economics of nuclear power.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II studies the LDCE of 
nuclear power generation relative to some viable alternatives, in particular coal fired TEPPs. 
Section III presents and justifies the estimated econometric model and the results from the 
estimation. Section IV concludes.   
II. The Levelized Discounted Cost of Electricity 
 I use the Levelized Discounted Cost of Electricity (LDCE) as the input price for both 
technologies. The LDCE is a constant price which if received by the plant owner for each unit of 
electricity generated over its lifetime will provide a flow of revenues just sufficient to cover all of 
the costs incurred in building and operating the plant throughout its life (Deutch and Lester, 2004, 
57). Mathematically, if NCFt stands for the net cash flow of the plant in year t, n is the lifetime of 
the plant, i is the prevailing discount rate, then the LDCE solves the present value equation: 
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The above equation reveals much of the appeal of using the LDCE as the input price for both 
options. Since NCFt can be vastly different for different technologies, the above approach allows 
you to treat on an equal footing very dissimilar cost structures. This makes the LDCE approach 
especially advantageous in comparing nuclear and coal power-generating technologies. NPPs 
have always been characterized by high upfront costs and long construction periods, while coal 
plants take much less time and money to complete. In the same time, once online, NPPs are 
cheap to run, relative to coal-fired TEPPs, because uranium is such a high energy-density source. 
Coal plants are much more sensitive to the fuel component and are subject to constant shocks in 
the price of coal.  
The changing economic position of nuclear power relative to fossil fuel based generation 
in recent years which has lead to the possibility of a nuclear renaissance discussed above has led 
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to a parallel renaissance in the literature of nuclear economics. There have been several major 
studies dedicated to comparing costs from different modes of power generation. All of these 
studies are similar in that they employ the levelized cost methodology.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA) published in 2005 their conclusions 
from the sixth in a series of studies Projected Costs of Generating Electricity. They estimate the 
cost of generating electricity across different power plants and across ten different countries.  
The possible revival of nuclear power generation in the United States has led a team from 
MIT to conduct their own study into this technology’s economic merits. The main criterion of 
economic competitiveness is low levelized cost of electricity production. The Future of Nuclear 
Power (MIT 2003) compares this cost between nuclear, coal and gas plants. Unlike the 
IEA/OECD-NEA study reviewed above, MIT’s analysis shows nuclear power generation to be an 
unattractive option.  
Another study that examines the cost of producing electricity from different technologies 
is the Reference Costs for Power Generation (2003), conducted by the General Directorate for 
Energy and Raw Materials (DGEMP) of the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and 
Industry, in collaboration with industry experts. The study is slightly different than the preceding 
examples in that it is mainly concerned with the investor’s point of view: standard discount rates 
are taken to discount future costs to the present and investment costs such as interest during the 
construction period are included in the calculations of levelized costs. By performing a full 
analysis at 3%, 5%, 8% and 11% discount rates the study gives a measure of the sensitivity of 
project costs on discount rates. Unlike the previous studies, this one includes explicitly the costs 
of greenhouse emissions in the coal and gas cases.  
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In Competitiveness Comparison of the Electricity Production Alternatives (2003), 
Tarjanne and Luostarinen compare the costs of electricity generation from different plant types in 
Finland. The alternatives discussed are not limited to nuclear, coal and gas-fired plants, but also 
include some renewable energy source such as a wind turbine. The study aims at providing the 
most accurate information on costs of generating electricity in Finland and thus costs are based 
on the March 2003 price level in Finland. Similarly to the DGEMP report, emission trading is 
considered. The study assumes an unusually high load factor3 of 91.3%. In contrast, the other 
studies discussed limit themselves to an 85% load factor.  
The Cost of Generating Electricity (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004) is another 
study of comparative electricity-generation costs across different available technologies. It is 
similar to the Finnish report discussed previously in that it takes on the question from a very 
country-specific perspective. In particular it aims at answering the question what is the best mix 
of technologies for power generation in the United Kingdom. The choice is between the usual 
nuclear, coal and gas as well as some renewable-source technologies such as wind turbines and 
biomass.  
The U.S. Department of Energy assigned the University of Chicago to carry out an 
authoritative study into the competitiveness of NPPs against the main alternatives, coal and gas-
fired plants. The findings of this study came out in The Economic Future of Nuclear Power 
(University of Chicago, 2004). What is interesting about this study is that it emphasizes the cost 
of implementation of some of the new technologies recently developed in the nuclear sector that 
were discussed in the introduction. This is done through the introduction of first-of-a-kind 
engineering (FOAKE) costs for NPPs. To counter-balance these, the report also includes a 
                                                 
3 The load factor, or capacity factor, of a power plant is the ratio of the actual amount of energy it produces divided 
over the theoretical maximum.  
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parameter for the possible impact of learning-by-doing, which would cut these at 3% annually. 
As a result of the FOAKE costs, this study finds the first couple of units in a new NPP to be more 
expensive than later ones. These conclusions suggest some assistance from the government may 
be necessary to make a new NPP attractive to investors. 
Levelized Unit Electricity Cost of Comparison of Alternative Technologies for Baseload 
Generation in Ontario (CERI 2004) is an independent study performed by the Canadian Nuclear 
Association which aims at choosing among nuclear, combined cycle gas turbines and coal plants 
as the most appropriate for power generation in Ontario.  
The results of each of the above studies are summarized in Table 1. Some fundamental 
assumptions have to be made in each of these studies that are dictated by their common 
methodology, regardless of their scope and perspective. Among these, there is a subset of key 
assumptions which drive the disparity in results evident in Table 1. The difference in the assumed 
overnight costs of construction4 is a major source of result variability. So are dissimilar 
assumptions of fuel prices, especially those of gas. Variations in technical assumptions, such as 
the load factor, introduce another degree of freedom in the results. Some of the aforementioned 
studies explicitly assign a cost of emissions from coal and gas plants, others do not, further 
affecting the results. Finally, the most obvious source of variation in the results is the diversity of 
discount factors utilized in this panel of analyses.  
The World Nuclear Association (WNA) is a private organization which serves as a round-
table for the people and institutions that comprise the global nuclear power industry. In 2005 it 
came out with a report titled The New Economics of Nuclear Power. The report strives to provide 
“definitive analysis of the costs of constructing and operating a nuclear power plans in the 21st 
                                                 
4 Overnight construction costs are the costs incurred during the building of a power plant, including equipment, 
engineering and labor expenditures, quoted without the interest accrued during the construction period (hence the 
term “overnight” – no interest would be accumulated if construction was literary done overnight).  
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century” (WNA 2005). It does so by distilling the conclusions of many recent studies on the 
subject, including the ones mentioned above. The principal conclusion of the report is that 
nuclear power is the cheapest way to generate electricity in most industrialized countries today, 
even without consideration of its geopolitical and environmental advantages, which are becoming 
increasingly recognized today. The study attributes this improved economic competitiveness to 
decreased costs. Standardized designs and shorter construction times have brought construction 
costs down. Streamlined licensing procedures have been made possible due to the technological 
advances and the safety record of the industry. These translate into reduced regulatory costs and 
associated uncertainty by allowing predictable timetables to be drawn. As a result, financing 
NPPs has become cheaper. Operating costs have been subject to the same downward trend: in the 
US alone they have decreased by 44% from 1990 to 2003. Increased capacity factors are largely 
responsible for that phenomenon. Increased investment in refurbishment and capacity upgrades 
as well as a rise in the number of applications for license extensions serve as a testament to the 
marked ascend in the profitability of existing plants. Based on these observations and recent 
studies, the report advocates nuclear power’s long-term competitiveness. 
Both in the introduction and its conclusion the WNA report (2005) stresses the sensitivity 
of its finding and the findings of similar studies to their specific assumptions and “local 
conditions”. This is why, in reviewing the recent literature of comparative electricity cost studies, 
I put the greatest emphasis on this last report prepared by the architect-engineer of the Belene 
project, WorleyParsons. In Feasibility Study Report of Belene Nuclear Power Plant Section 5 
Annex from 2005, a WorleyParsons team lead by economist Lynn Rubow compares the cost of 
electricity from the Belene NPP and three alternatives: a lignite-fired TEPP, and imported coal 
TEPP and a natural gas fueled TEPP. These alternatives are chosen so that they deliver the same 
quantity of electric energy as the Belene NPP.  
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The Parsons study develops in some detail external costs associated with fossil and 
nuclear technologies. This portion of the analysis is based on the authoritative ExternE study 
carried out by the EU. The ExternE treatment is “technology neutral” (Rubow, 2005, 3), meaning 
external costs are not biased toward any particular technology.  
The external costs of nuclear power are separated in two categories: financial costs and 
the effects of ionizing radiation on health and the environment.  
External financial liabilities can be further broken down into decommissioning costs, 
costs associated with spent fuel disposal and storage and catastrophic accident costs. The 
financial costs of decommissioning and spent fuel management can be accurately estimated and 
internalized by creating dedicated accrual accounts in which resources are allocated for those 
purposes throughout plant operation. Financial liabilities arising from accidents are internalized 
by insurance. The Parsons study estimates the external costs of severe accidents to be below 5% 
of the external costs of routine operation of an NPP, or alternatively, less than 1% of the nuclear 
fuel costs excluding externalities, thus having a very minimal effect on the overall cost structure 
of a nuclear plant.  
The external impacts on health and the environment in routine operation of a reactor are 
developed by the Parsons study again in concordance with the ExternE methodology. First, the 
physical impact of constructing, operating and decommissioning an NPP on the environment and 
human activity, such as diseases, fatalities, effects on water and food, etc., are described. These 
effects are then quantified and monetized5. The results are extremely sensitive on the choice of a 
discount factor: the external costs at a 0% discount rate are 50 times greater than at a 10% 
                                                 
5 The question arises as to the appropriate discount factor. This is a sensitive issue, since some by-products of fission 
have ostensible environmental effects many years into the future. A low discount factor means people now bear most 
of the costs and in this way it favors future generations. Conversely, a high discount factor favors present 
generations. This choice is clearly outside of the realm of positive economics and has been called “political” and 
even “meta-ethical” (Rubow, 2005, 8). 
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discount rate (Rubow, 2005, 9). However, even in the upper limit the overall external costs of a 
nuclear fuel cycle in normal operation do not exceed 10% of the direct costs.  
 In developing the external costs for the fossil options some of the same considerations are 
taken into account. One important distinction is the introduction of direct emissions costs. Since 
nuclear power generation does not produce any emissions these costs are relevant solely for the 
fossil options. In the Parsons study fossil-fuel plants are charged the full amount of their 
emissions, since any emission represents the foregone opportunity of selling an amount of 
emissions permits on the European emissions trading market. In this treatment, the external costs 
associated with fossil fuel power generation far exceed, both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of direct costs, the external costs associated with NPPs.   
The Parsons study considers the social impact of all options. The choice of technology, 
whether domestic or imported fuel, and domestic or foreign equipment and services will be used 
is likely to have a substantial effect on the overall Bulgarian economy. Job creation under any 
economic conditions, other than full employment, is a positive stimulus to every economy. There 
are indirect benefits to the government, which gains a tax payer while shedding an unemployed 
person. There is a multiplier effect from each job created, which can be intuitively understood as 
additional employment necessary to satisfy the needs of the newly employed. With these 
considerations in mind, the Parsons study discusses the differential contribution ot employment 
the four alternatives present. The natural gas option has a low contribution to short-term and 
permanent employment as it requires few people (relative to the other options) for construction 
and operation. Also, it is highly depended on imported fuel and components. In this perspective, 
it is inferior in its impact on the local economy than both coal options and the nuclear option. 
These have a high contribution to both short-term and permanent employment as they require a 
large number of laborers for construction and similarly large highly skilled personnel to operate 
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them. Since lignite coal is abundant in Bulgaria, the lignite option has the added advantage of 
being able to use domestic resources.  
Rubow’s group develops an economic model which incorporates all of the above 
considerations as well as development of fuel, capital and operating costs and uses that to 
compare the nuclear option with the three fossil fuel options in terms of their LDCE. Figure 1 
presents a flow chart of the model. Figure 2 presents the results of the economic analysis. The 
Belene NPP has comparative economic benefits relative to the three fossil options, which are 
much more pronounced upon consideration of externalities.  
The studies reviewed above, with an emphasis on the Parsons study, provide evidence in 
support of the fact that nuclear power generation has a lower LDCE than coal power generation. 
The nuclear option is superior to the coal option in terms of input price. To complete the analysis 
I now turn to the marginal product of each technology.  
III. Estimated Output Elasticity of Nuclear and Coal Energy: 
 The output elasticity estimates are based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. This 
traditional form is augmented to include multiplicative energy terms. In double-log, the 
estimation equation assumes the form: 
     ttt
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Output growth is a function of the capital-labor ratio. The coefficients of interest are 2β and 3β , 
the output elasticity of energy from nuclear- and coal-based generation, respectively, both of 
which should be positive.  These output elasticity estimates reflect the respective marginal 
products. The third energy term is featured in the regression to account for the remainder of the 
energy input to the economy. Eqn. (3) is estimated using annual U.S. data in the period 1965-
2006. A key assumption is that the same qualitative relationship between the productivity of the 
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two technologies holds in Bulgaria. This is arguably a bold assumption, but it is necessary. One 
of the classical assumptions under which ordinary least squares estimation is permitted requires 
variability in the regressors. As discussed in the Introduction, Bulgaria has thus far only had one 
NPP and therefore it has insufficient variability in the energy delivered from this source6.  
 An important difference between a traditional Cobb-Douglas and eqn. (3) is the use of the 
capital-labor ratio instead of both variables separately. The reason for doing so is the extremely 
high in-sample multicollinearity between these variables. Although (imperfect) multicollinearity 
does not violate any of the Classical Assumptions, it could lead to perverse results, especially in 
small samples such as this one7. The use of the capital-labor ratio, or even the omission of either 
capital or labor is actually a common technique in endogenous growth literature8. In this 
specification, 1β is the output elasticity of capital per worker, which can be interpreted as the 
percentage point change in output per 1% increase in the capital-labor ratio, holding all else 
constant. I expect this to be positive. 
 It is not clear empirically how to best measure labor and capital services. Many 
specifications were attempted using different variables. Some scholars argue an index of hours 
worked may be used for labor services in lieu of total non-farm payrolls. The argument is that 
total non-farm payrolls is a measure insensitive to economic turning points, as companies are 
hesitant to lay off workers due to the costs of recruitment. Instead laborers get assigned less 
work, a phenomenon which can clearly be observed in an index of hours worked. Although such 
                                                 
6 Ideally, eqn. (3) should be estimated on a cross-section of countries with varied energy-generation portfolios. 
Unfortunately, capital stock data is generally not provided by statistical agencies even in Western European 
countries, precluding such an analysis.  
7 Here is one way to understand this. If two variables are highly mutlicollinear, the computer randomly attributes the 
explanatory power they posses to only one of them. The other usually falls out of significance. Also, its coefficient 
estimate might have the wrong sign, as the estimation will be largely driven by the few instances in the sample when 
the two variables differ, which are usually due to random shocks driving those variables in opposite directions for no 
systematic reasons.    
8 See for example Abel, Bernanke and Croushore (2008), pp. 238-240.   
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“labor hoarding” is a well-established macroeconomic phenomenon, it is not pertinent to eqn. (3). 
Capital is utilized and made productive by worker’s skills. It is much more intuitively appealing, 
therefore, to use total non-farm payrolls in constructing the capital-labor ratio featured in the 
model. When considering the productive stock of capital care must be taken not to include 
measures of fixed assets which are essentially idle, as for example residential private fixed assets 
(housing). While such a measure of the capital stock reflects a major source of wealth for 
households, it does not accurately capture the productive stock of capital. Therefore, I choose the 
net stock of private fixed nonresidential assets. 
  Eqn. (3) controls for variability in output exogenous to labor, capital and energy services. 
In a time-series of output, one has to control for the underlying trend in output growth, due to 
technological progress, as well as the cyclical variations in output around this trend. These two 
effects are captured by Year and Y_gap. The Year coefficient ( 6β ) captures the average annual 
growth-rate of output independent of other factors, i.e. the average annual growth-rate of 
technological progress. It is expected to be positive. A 1% increase in the output gap leads to 
a 5β *100 percentage points change in GDP. When the economy is above potential (Y_gap is 
positive), the growth of output is generally positive; when the economy is below potential (Y_gap 
is negative) growth of output is usually negative. Thus, 5β  is also expected to be positive.   
 One final consideration is the Three Mile Island Accident. The Introduction noted how 
this accident resulted in a permanent shift away from nuclear energy. One might think it is 
appropriate to somehow, via a dummy variable, splitting the sample, or otherwise, account for 
this structural change. Figure 3, however, reveals it is hard to detect a shift in trend due to the 
accident. It is evident from the graph that the dip in energy consumption from NPPs is modest 
and short-lived. Indeed, there have been no new constriction permits for NPPs issued in the U.S. 
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since 1979, but there have been many issued right before the accident leading to many new plants 
coming online after the partial meltdown. This circumstance masked the effects of the Three Mile 
Island accident on the industry.  
 Table 2 provides definitions, sources and descriptive statistics for the data used. A few 
figures are worth pointing out. The mean value of Y_gap over the sample period, -0.318, is 
indistinguishable from zero within one standard deviation (2.433). The U.S. economy has done a 
good job at keeping in line with its potential in the past four decades. A substantially higher 
amount of energy derived from oil and gas (548.9 Mtoe and 397.4 Mtoe) was used relative to 
coal-generated energy (291.8 Mtoe). This is explained by the significant proportion of energy that 
goes for transportation and household heating instead of electricity generation. Lastly note the 
minimum amount of nuclear energy is close to zero, reflecting the relative novelty of this 
technology – as mentioned in the introduction the prospect of using nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes was not envisioned until 1954.  
 Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. As is common with time-series, the regression 
exhibits a very high R-square of 0.99, suggesting that 99% of the variability in the U.S. GDP data 
is explained by the model. The control parameters 1β , 4β , 5β  and 6β  are all significant at the 1% 
level and of the expected sign. The magnitude of some estimates is reassuring. For example, 6β  
suggests that the average annual growth-rate of technological progress has been around 2.4%, 
which is in line with the growth indicated by empirical macroeconomic literature. As revealed by 
2β  , all else equal, a 1% increase in the consumption of energy delivered from nuclear sources, 
has lead to a 0.012% increase in U.S. GDP in the period 1965-2006, significant at the 1% level. 
In the same time, 3β implies that a 1% increase in the consumption of energy delivered from coal 
sources has lead to a 0.046% increase in U.S. GDP. Although this last result is insignificant, it 
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does provide some evidence that coal power-generating technology has exhibited higher 
productivity than nuclear power-generating technology in the period 1965-2006 in the U.S. 
IV. Conclusion: 
An investigation into the marginal cost of coal power-generating technology versus the 
marginal cost of nuclear power-generating technology was performed through the perspective of 
the Belene NPP project underway in Bulgaria. Studies provide some evidence that the Belene 
NPP has a lower LDCE than coal alternatives. A Cobb-Douglas production function augmented 
with multiplicative energy terms estimated with U.S. data suggests, however, that the nuclear 
option is less productive. Combining these findings in eqn. (1) reveals the relative position of the 
marginal cost of the Belene project relative to a coal alternative is ambiguous, depending on the 
relative magnitude of the price and productivity effects which push it in opposite directions. As it 
stands, the question of whether the Belene NPP is superior to a coal alternative cannot be 
answered with certainty.  
This paper leaves ample room for further investigation in several directions. While the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is an appropriate first step, other functional forms such as 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions might provide an alternative 
environment for introducing energy as an input in production. More importantly, repeating the 
above analysis with an extended data set should provide more robust results. Ideally, one would 
want to use a panel of countries which have used nuclear power over many years to introduce 
fixed-effect type of variation in energy-generating portfolios. Obtaining data on the productive 
stock of capital across different countries is a prerequisite to such an analysis, however. 
Unfortunately, measures of the net stock of capital are not readily available for most countries, 
even for developed European countries. Finally, this study begs the question is there an a priori 
reason that the there should be a differential in the output elasticity of energy derived from 
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different sources, or is this result simply an artifact of the sample used. One possible reason why 
this might be a real effect is the different physical efficiencies of different power-generating 
technologies. It has been suggested these should be translated completely into the input price 
differential. While I do not find a convincing explanation as to why the differential result should 
be expected, I find the rebuttal of the physical efficiencies hypothesis equally unconvincing. 
Perhaps energy generation markets are inefficient at translating the physical efficiency 
differentials into price differentials. Still, this question remains very much open and potentially a 
fertile ground for further research.  
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Appendix – Tables and Figures 
Table 1. 
 
Figure 1. Rubow’s Economic Model Flow Chart 
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Figure 2. Rubow’s LDCE Results 
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Table 2.  
variable name definition (source) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Y
real GDP in billions of chained 2000 dollars 
(FRED) 6,540 2,409 3,191 11,319
Y*
potential real GDP in billions of chained 2000 
dollars (FRED) 6,572 2,426 3,085 11,372
Y_gap
percentage point departure from potential: 
=(Y/Y*-1)*100 -0.318 2.433 -6.726 5.413
L
total nonfarm payrolls in thousands; annual 
average of monthly data (FRED) 99,452 23,050 60,878 136,091
K
chain-type quantity index (2000=100) for net 
stock of private fixed nonresidential assets 
(BEA) 67.9 24.2 31 111
EN
consumption of energy derived from nuclear 
power generation, in million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (mtoe) (BP Statistical Review of 
Energy) 96.9 66.5 0.8 187.8
EC
consumption of energy derived from coal 
power generation, in mtoe (BP Statistical 
Review of Energy) 432.3 98.1 291.8 574.2
EO
consumption of energy derived from oil power 
generation, in millions of tonnes (BP 
Statistical Review of Energy) 789 97.7 548.9 951.4
EG
consumption of energy derived from gas 
power generation, in mtoe (BP Statistical 
Review of Energy) 521.3 54.9 397.4 602.7
EH
consumption of energy derived from 
hydroelectric power generation, in mtoe (BP 
Statistical Review of Energy) 63.1 8.4 45.0 81.5
NOTE: Number of observations = 42 for all variables  
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Figure 3.  
Energy Consumption Derived from Nuclear- vs. Coal-based Power in the United States: 1965-2006 
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Table 3.  
Preferred
Variable: Model:
K/L >0 Coeff. 0.286***
St. Err. 0.077
p-value <0.001
Year >0 Coeff. 0.024***
St. Err. 0.001
p-value <0.001
Ygap >0 Coeff. 0.01***
St. Err. <0.001
p-value <0.001
lnEN >0 Coeff. 0.012***
St. Err. 0.003
p-value <0.001
lnEC >0 Coeff. 0.046
St. Err. 0.039
p-value 0.121
lnEOther >0 Coeff. 0.128***
St. Err. 0.035
p-value <0.001
R-sqr. 0.99
Adj. R-sqr. 0.99
Note: *** labels significance at the 
1% level
HA:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
